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Abstract
Investment in human capital is an important tool for reducing poverty. However,
the poor may lack the capacity to aspire, which often results in underinvestment in their
children￿ s education. This paper studies the e⁄ect of a social program on the educational
aspirations of the poor, and explores the role of exposure to educated professionals as
a possible channel for increasing aspirations. First, using di⁄erences-in-di⁄erences, we
show that bene￿ciary parents of the Mexican antipoverty program PROGRESA have
higher educational aspirations for their children of a third of a school year than do
non-bene￿ciary parents. This e⁄ect corresponds to a 15% increase in the proportion of
parents who aspire for their children to ￿nish college. Then, we exploit the design of
the program whose requirements cause its target population to have di⁄erent levels of
mandated exposure to doctors and nurses. Our triple di⁄erence estimate shows that,
educational aspirations for children from high-exposure households (relative to low-
exposure households) in treatment villages (relative to control villages) were a third
of a school year higher six months after the start of the program (relative to before
its introduction). These results suggest that the change in aspirations is driven by
exposure to highly educated professionals.
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11 Introduction
Many have argued that education speci￿cally and investment in human capital more gen-
erally could be the most e⁄ective way to reduce poverty (e.g., Becker, 1995). However,
poverty may not only create constraints that limit the ability to invest in human capital,
but it may also a⁄ect people￿ s attitudes and interest in education. If the poor perceive a
narrower range of life options or possibilities, they may lack the capacity to aspire, which
leads to underinvestment in their children￿ s education (Ray, 2006; Appadurai, 2004).
Research shows that parents￿educational aspirations for their children are positively
correlated with their children￿ s educational outcomes (Goodman and Gregg, 2010; Gregg
and Washbrook, 2009; and Gutman and Akerman, 2008a and 2008b), and that higher
aspirations of the poor can lead to an increase in investment in human capital (Macours and
Vakis, 2009). Hence, helping the poor to enhance their aspirations may have a positive e⁄ect
on reducing poverty. In particular, understanding whether aspirations can be changed and
identifying the channels through which this change can occur are essential. Unfortunately,
little research is available on the evolution of aspirations.
This paper studies the e⁄ect of an antipoverty program on poor parents￿educational
aspirations for their children and explores the role of mandated exposure to educated pro-
fessionals as a possible way to increase aspirations. In particular, it analyzes whether poor
parents￿aspirations for the educational attainment of their children can be improved as a
result of exposure to doctors and nurses￿ a group of individuals with much higher educa-
tional level and economic status than theirs.
First, using di⁄erences-in-di⁄erences, we compare the outcomes of households that had
been randomly selected to receive the bene￿ts of the Mexican antipoverty program PRO-
GRESA against the outcomes of households that had not been selected to participate in
the program. Results suggest that bene￿ciary parents have higher educational aspirations
for their children of a third of a school year than do non-bene￿ciary parents. When con-
sidering daughters and sons separately, we ￿nd a signi￿cant e⁄ect for daughters whereas
there seems to be no signi￿cant e⁄ect for sons. The magnitude of this e⁄ect is comparable
to that associated with parents having two extra years of schooling. This is quite relevant,
given that the average education of adults in our sample is about three years.
2Furthermore, we consider as an alternative aspiration variable the proportion of parents
who declared that they wanted their children to at least ￿nish college in order to see the
impact of the program on the proportion of households that aspired for their children to
complete college. We ￿nd a 15% and a 19% increase in the proportion of parents who
aspire for their children to complete college six months and one year after the start of the
program, respectively. When considering daughters separately, increments are higher, with
a 20% and a 25% increase in the proportion of parents who aspire for their daughters to
complete college six months and one year after the start of the program, respectively. These
￿ndings add to the extensive literature on the direct and indirect e⁄ects of PROGRESA
on a large number of outcomes.1
Next, we explore one possible channel through which PROGRESA might a⁄ect aspi-
rations: exposure to educated professionals. We exploit the design of the program whose
requirements cause its target population to have di⁄erent levels of mandated exposure to
doctors and nurses. We divide the sample into two groups: households with children less
than ￿ve years of age￿ which have a high level of exposure to health personnel because they
must visit the clinic at least four times per year￿ and households with no children less than
￿ve years of age￿ which have a low level of exposure to health personnel because they must
visit the clinic only once or twice per year. To identify the e⁄ect of the di⁄erential expo-
sure to educated professionals on parents￿aspirations, we use a triple di⁄erences estimator.
That is, we estimate the change in average aspirations before and after the introduction of
PROGRESA for households with high exposure to highly educated professionals relative to
households with low exposure in treatment villages relative to control villages. Average as-
pirations for children from high-exposure households (relative to low-exposure households)
in treatment villages (relative to control villages) are a third of a school year higher six
months after the start of the program (relative to before its introduction). This di⁄erence
is statistically signi￿cant and suggests that the channel through which parental aspirations
are changing is the households￿exposure to highly educated professionals. When consid-
ering daughters and sons separately, we ￿nd a half of a school year e⁄ect for daughters
and no statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect for sons. Moreover, exposure seems to trigger a 40%
1For an excellent review of a number of studies that analyze the impact of PROGRESA, see Parker,
Rubalcava, and Teruel (2008).
3increase in the proportion of high exposure parents who aspire for their daughters to ￿nish
college. We ￿nd no statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect for sons. A plausible explanation of why
parents are changing their aspirations mainly for daughters and not for sons is that program
participants are exposed to health professionals which are mainly female.
Interestingly, a year after the start of the program, the aspirations of parents from
low-exposure households catch up with those of parents from high-exposure households.
Recall that the low-exposure households are also required to visit the clinics, but with
lesser frequency. Therefore, a good fraction might not have had exposure at the six-month
time point. This suggests that aspirations might be a⁄ected by a minimum amount of
exposure (i.e., a minimum number of meetings) and not by the frequency of exposure.
Some might worry that the interpretation of these results might not come solely from
an exposure e⁄ect. However, we are able to rule out a number of alternative e⁄ects. These
changes in aspirations are not due to an income e⁄ect from the cash transfers received
by the households because transfers are higher for low-exposure households than for high-
exposure households. This is so because low-exposure households have a greater number of
school-age children who are eligible to receive the educational cash transfers of PROGRESA,
which constitute the largest component of the program￿ s transfers. Furthermore, parental
aspirations about their children￿ s education do not seem to be driven by an age e⁄ect.
Because parents￿educational aspirations for their children are less malleable with the child￿ s
increasing age, we might be picking up a greater mutability of aspirations for younger
children as opposed to older children. We explore this potential phenomenon by looking at
the e⁄ect of variability in the child￿ s age on aspirations, and we do not ￿nd such an e⁄ect.
An additional concern could be associated with the fact that visits to the clinic might
not only expose parents to educated professionals, but might also make children healthier
and so have an impact on the educational aspirations of the parents. However, parental
aspirations do not seem to be linked to children￿ s health status. Moreover, the aspirations
of non-eligible parents change neither at six months nor at one year after the start of
PROGRESA, which indicates that our ￿ndings are not caused by any event occurring in
the treatment villages that would have a⁄ected high-exposure households di⁄erently than
low-exposure households.
4The ￿nding that exposure to health professionals can contribute to changes in aspira-
tions is important for at least three reasons. First, identifying a possible channel through
which aspirations of the poor can be modi￿ed adds a new tool to the existing options that
try to promote increased investments in human capital and productive assets as a means to
escape poverty. Second, by design, a number of anti-poverty programs expose their target
populations to doctors, nurses, teachers, and many other highly educated professionals.
Policy-makers could harness the potential bene￿t of increased aspirations that are associ-
ated with exposure to highly educated professionals by encouraging or requiring that the
bene￿ciaries of anti-poverty programs meet with such professionals a su¢ cient number of
times. Third, the ￿nding suggests that, in highly segregated environments or in contexts in
which there is low social interaction or lack of leadership, promoting exposure to external
educated professionals may have important consequences with respect to the aspirations of
the population.
While the focus of this paper is on understanding the e⁄ect of exposure to professionals
on aspirations, this e⁄ect might operate through a number of di⁄erent mechanisms. Ex-
posure to highly educated professionals may cause information ￿ ows that allow parents to
learn about (previously unknown or previously considered unattainable) opportunities for
their children and the investment it takes to reach these opportunities; it may change the
consideration sets for people who have limited knowledge or bounded rationality; and/or it
may change the socioeconomic environment of the poor.
This study is linked to the theoretical work on why exposure to individuals with a higher
educational level and economic status may matter for increasing aspirations and decreasing
poverty. In this sense, our paper brings support to the ideas developed in Ray (2006) and
previously by anthropologists such as Appadurai (2004), which assign a central role in the
formation and evolution of individual aspirations to the socioeconomic environment.2 This
paper also relates to the active discussion on the fact that people￿ s choices are a⁄ected by a
limited considerations set. This basic idea has been discussed under a range of forms e.g.,
the literature on bounded rationality, narrowing bracketing, and limited attention (Rabin
and Weizs￿cker, forthcoming; DellaVigna, 2009; Barberis, Huang, and Thaler, 2006; Gabaix
2Additional papers are Mookherjee, Napel and Ray (2010), and Genicot and Ray (2009).
5et al., 2006; Kahneman, 2003; Rubinstein, 1998; Frank, 1985 and 1997; and Conlisk, 1996).
Likewise, our research is connected to studies on how people￿ s choices are conditioned by
their sense of identity (Munshi and Rosenzweig, 2005; and Ho⁄ and Pandey, 2004) and
by their perceived returns (Jensen, 2010), as well as to the empirical literature on social
interactions and peer e⁄ects, which shows that residents of poor neighborhoods achieve
lower socioeconomic outcomes and attain lower educational levels than do the residents
of more a› uent neighborhoods (Gould, Lavy, and Paserman, 2009; Kling, Liebman, and
Katz, 2007; SÆnchez-Peæa, 2007; and Case and Katz, 1991). In fact, our paper suggests
that social exposure could be a way to attain better behavioral outcomes in poor areas.
The following section describes PROGRESA and explains how the program promotes
the exposure of the bene￿ciaries to individuals with higher educational levels and economic
status as well as how we identify the subgroups subject to a higher level of exposure.
Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 outlines the empirical strategy and shows the
results. Section 5 performs some robustness checks. Section 6 shows the relationship
between educational aspirations and behavioral outcomes. Finally, Section 7 summarizes
the results and concludes.
2 PROGRESA and bene￿ciaries￿exposure to health person-
nel3
In 1997, the Mexican government started the Programa de Educaci￿n, Salud y Alimentaci￿n
(PROGRESA) in rural Mexico in an e⁄ort to break the intergenerational transmission of
poverty. The primary objective of the program is to improve the educational, health, and
nutritional status of poor families, particularly of children and mothers (Skou￿as, 2005).
PROGRESA￿ s two main components are health and education. In this paper, we exploit
the key features of the former.
The health component of the program requires every female household head to attend
her locality￿ s health clinic to get educational talks about vaccinations, nutrition, contracep-
tion, and hygiene once a month. Furthermore, every family member must visit his or her
3This section draws extensively on Gertler (2000) and Skou￿as (2005) who provide a much more detailed
description of the program and evaluation data set.
6locality￿ s health centers for preventive and/or monitoring check-ups for the household to
qualify for the nutritional component. The frequency of the visits for each member depends
on his or her age. Additionally, in the case of women, the frequency of the visits increases if
the women are pregnant or have recently given birth. In particular, pregnant women must
have ￿ve prenatal care visits starting in the ￿rst trimester; lactating women must have two
visits a year during which their nutrition is monitored and they receive family-planning
information and undergo physical check-ups; children less than two years old must visit the
clinic every two months for growth monitoring, immunizations, and well-baby care; children
2-5 years old must visit the clinic every three months for growth monitoring, well-child care,
and immunizations; children 5-16 must visit the clinic once every six months; and other
adolescents and adults must visit the clinic for annual physical check-ups (Gertler, 2000;
and PROGRESA, 1999). Quali￿ed households secure a small monetary (health-conditional)
transfer of a ￿xed amount regardless of household size.4 The main reason for which the
program started providing health-conditional transfers was to stimulate health clinic at-
tendance and regular check-ups, which were both very low in rural Mexico (see Gertler,
2000).
Hence, by ful￿lling the requirements of the health component, PROGRESA￿ s bene￿cia-
ries are exposed to nurses and doctors: i.e., individuals who have attained higher educational
levels and higher economic status. In Mexico, in order to become a nurse it is necessary to
earn a degree in nursing, which takes 2-5 years, after completing high school; to become a
doctor, it is necessary to complete at least six years of a college degree in medicine. Thus,
nurses have at least 14 years of education and doctors at least 18. These education levels
are much higher than those of the adult population under consideration, which has, on
average, three years of education (see Table 1).
The mandated exposure to doctors and nurses is more frequent for households with
children less than ￿ve years old in particular compared to the frequency for households
with older or no children at all. Households with children less than ￿ve years old must go
to the health clinics at least four times per year. In contrast, households with older children
4Households also receive nutritional supplements for children less than two years old and pregnant and
lactating women. Nutritional supplements are also provided for children ages 2-5 if they present stunting
symptoms.
7must visit the health clinics twice per year, and households without children only once.
The other main component of the program is the educational component. Bene￿ciary
households with children ages 9-17 who are enrolled in school and attending at least 85%
of the school days each month as well as during the academic year receive an education-
conditional grant. The grant increases with grade and, for secondary education, is slightly
higher for girls than for boys. In addition, households with the appropriate school-age
children receive a grant for school supplies. In general, all transfers are received by the
female household head.5
On average, bene￿ciary households receive about 197 pesos monthly (expressed in No-
vember 1998 pesos);6 this represents 19.5% of the mean value of consumption of eligible
households in control localities (Skou￿as, 2005). The program has survived two changes
of administration in Mexico. However, at its inception, bene￿ciaries were granted the pro-
gram￿ s bene￿ts for only a three-year period. This was a credible threat because, prior to
PROGRESA, social programs in Mexico used to dissolve as soon as there was a change in
the political administration.
3 The data
An experimental design was adopted for PROGRESA￿ s evaluation, exploiting its sequen-
tial expansion. A subset of 506 eligible localities in Guerrero, Hidalgo, MichoacÆn, Puebla,
QuerØtaro, San Luis Potos￿, and Veracruz was randomly chosen to participate in the eval-
uation sample: 320 localities were randomly chosen as treatment and started receiving
bene￿ts in May 1998; 186 were used as controls and started receiving bene￿ts in December
1999. In the control localities, no household was informed that PROGRESA would have
provided bene￿ts at a later date.
In every locality where the program is implemented, households are selected as eligible
to receive PROGRESA￿ s bene￿ts based on their poverty level. Data from the baseline
survey shows that about 52% of the households in an eligible locality were classi￿ed as
5Children 13-17 years old in upper-secondary school can receive the transfers directly.
6The calculation of this average includes households that did not receive any bene￿ts due to nonadherence
to the conditions of the program or delays in the veri￿cation of the requirements of the program or in the
delivery of the monetary bene￿ts (Skou￿as, 2005). The exchange rate at the time was about MX$10.00 =
US$1.00.
8poor and were o⁄ered the opportunity to participate in the program. Only about 10% of
these households chose not to enroll in PROGRESA. The data collected comprises repeated
observations over eight survey rounds for 24,000 households.
The data used in this paper come from the ￿rst four survey rounds.7 The ￿rst two
rounds were baseline surveys. That is, they were carried out before the program started
giving bene￿ts to the eligible treatment households. The last two rounds were carried
out once PROGRESA had started giving bene￿ts to the eligible treatment households but
before control households were incorporated into the program. From these data-sets, we
use only the observations of those households that were classi￿ed as poor at baseline unless
otherwise noted.8
The second, third, and fourth survey rounds contain data on aspirations.9 Speci￿cally,
the second baseline survey asks the following two questions to the person who responds to
the questionnaire: ￿Up to what level would you like your daughters to study?￿and ￿Up
to what level would you like your sons to study?￿ 10 In the third and fourth rounds, the
structure of the questions changed slightly. In these rounds, the respondent was asked to
declare the highest level of education that she would like each of her daughters (sons) to
complete.
Responses are coded by education level: elementary school (6 years of schooling), sec-
ondary school (9), high school (12), technical degree (12), college (16), and other (up to 21
if Ph.D.). For estimation purposes, we translated each of these levels into years of education
as speci￿ed in the parentheses next to each level.
Because the second survey does not contain information about aspirations for each
daughter (son) but for all daughters (sons) within a household, we conduct the analysis
at the household level.11 Thus, for the third and fourth survey rounds, we compute the
7ENCASEH97, ENCEL98M, ENCEL98O, and ENCEL99M.
8By July 1999, the program￿ s administration had added new households to the list of bene￿ciaries
because it felt that the original selection method was biased against the elderly poor who no longer lived
with their children (Skou￿as, 2005). These households started receiving the bene￿ts of PROGRESA about
eight months after the original bene￿ciaries did (Skou￿as, Davis, and de la Vega, 2001). For our analysis,
we classify these households as non-elegible given their late admission.
9The ￿rst survey round does not include any question regarding aspirations, but contains important
household and individual characteristics at baseline.
10The exact questions in Spanish are: ¿ Hasta quØ nivel le gustar￿a que estudiaran sus hijas? and ¿ Hasta
quØ nivel le gustar￿a que estudiaran sus hijos?
11We also follow this strategy since the data-sets were designed to be matched from one round to the
next at either the locality or household levels but not at the individual level. While from round to round
9maximum years of education that the respondent declared that she would like her daughters
(sons) to study if the household has more than one daughter (son) in order to match this
information with the responses from the second survey round.12 Finally, in order to analyze
changes in parental aspirations for all children, we compute the maximum years of education
that the respondent declared she would like any of her children to study.13
Behrman and Todd (1999) compare the characteristics of treatment and control group
households as measured at a point in time prior to having received any program services to
determine whether the control and treatment groups truly appear to have been randomly
assigned. An examination of the characteristics of the groups in terms of age, education,
access to health care, and income at the household level show more rejections of the null
than would be expected by chance given standard signi￿cance levels. Behrman and Todd
believe that these many rejections are due to the fact that the samples are large and tend
to reject even for minor di⁄erences.
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics by treatment status of some relevant characteristics
of the head of the household and the spouse of the head, such as their ages, educational
levels, and whether they were literate or spoke an indigenous language at baseline. Ta-
ble 1 also presents information on household characteristics and demographic structure.
Treatment and control households do not seem to di⁄er signi￿cantly except for the fact
that treatment households appear to have a somewhat younger head and a slightly higher
proportion of male children. In the empirical analysis, we control for such di⁄erences.
the demographic composition of the households does not present important changes, on average, trying to
match individuals results in many incongruencies. Parker, Rubalcava, and Teruel (2008) acknowledge that
some problems with matching identi￿ers at the individual level have been reported and refer the reader to
Teruel and Rubalcava (2007) for further discussion.
12The fact that the aspiration question changed slightly between rounds may raise the concern that
parents could change the answers they provide. For example, when asked the question as in the second
survey round, a mother may say she would love all her children to be rocket scientists because she values
education, but when asked about a speci￿c child, as in survey rounds three and four, her aspirations may
also re￿ ect her expectations about the child￿ s abilities, and she may say she would be happy if the child just
￿nished high school. If this were to be the case, the variable computing the maximum number of years of
education that the respondent declared that she would like her daughters (sons) to study would be di⁄erent
than the variable computing the minimum number of years of education that the respondent declared that
she would like her daughters (sons) to study. However we do not ￿nd this. Also, the results of the paper do
not change when using as alternative variable the minimum instead of the maximum.
13Results do not change if we use the minimun years of education.
104 Empirical strategy and results
This section is divided into two parts. First, we study the e⁄ect of PROGRESA on the
educational aspirations of the poor. Then, we investigate exposure to educated professionals
as a possible channel through which aspirations might change.
4.1 PROGRESA￿ s e⁄ect on aspirations
Having information on the parents￿aspirations for their children￿ s education from three
periods (one before and two after the implementation of the program) allows us to estimate
the impact after the ￿rst six months and after one year from the start of PROGRESA.
Table 2 summarizes the levels and changes in parental aspirations for children dividing the
sample into treatment and control groups. We present data for all children in columns
(i)-(iii), for daughters in columns (iv)-(vi), and for sons in columns (vii)-(ix). The ￿rst two
columns for either all children, daughters, or sons show the data by treatment category; the
third column shows the di⁄erences in average parental aspirations between treatment and
control households. Rows 1-3 of the table present the average parental aspirations in levels
at baseline, six months, and one year after the start of PROGRESA, respectively. Rows 4
and 5 show the changes in average parental aspirations between baseline and six months
and between baseline and one year, respectively.
Table 2 shows that, before PROGRESA started, parental aspirations were slightly lower
in the treatment group than in the control group; however, these di⁄erences are not statisti-
cally signi￿cant. After the start of the program, the aspirations of parents in the treatment
group increased relatively more than did the aspirations of parents in the control group.
The relative increase (the ￿di⁄erences-in-di⁄erences￿of the changes in parental aspirations)
for all children is 0.31 and 0.27 years of schooling after six months and one year of the start
of the program, respectively, 0.38 and 0.36 years of schooling for daughters, and 0.27 and
0.21 years of schooling for sons. These numbers are statistically signi￿cant when consid-
ering all children and daughters. Hence, PROGRESA seems to increase the educational
aspirations parents have for their children, particularly their daughters, by about a third
of a school year.
As shown in Table 1, both treatment and control groups are quite similar but di⁄er with
11respect to the age of the head of the household and the proportion of male children. Thus,
we incorporate these potential sources of variation in the parental educational aspirations
in the estimates of the following reduced form regression:
ASPivt = ￿ + ￿1Xivt + ￿2￿t + ￿3Tv + ￿4 (Tv ￿ ￿t) + "ivt (1)
where ASPivt denotes the educational aspirations of the parents of household i in village
v at time t; Xivt represents the set of observable characteristics that turned out to be
statistically di⁄erent between control and treatment households;14 ￿t is a time dummy;
Tv is a village dummy that equals one for households in treatment villages; and "ivt is an
idiosyncratic error term. The coe¢ cient of interest is ￿4, which estimates the impact of
PROGRESA on the educational aspirations of the bene￿ciaries towards their children.
The estimates of regression (1) are reported in Table 3. We analyze the impact of
PROGRESA on the educational aspirations of parents towards all their children (columns
1-3), and towards their daughters (columns 4-6) and their sons (columns 7-9) separately.
Panels A and B in Table 3 present the regression results six months and one year after
the start of the program, respectively. We estimate this e⁄ect without controlling for
unbalanced household characteristics in columns (1), (4), and (7), and including controls in
columns (3), (6), and (9). In all speci￿cations we cluster the standard errors at the village
level. All estimates are very similar to the simple di⁄erences-in-di⁄erences results shown in
Table 2. PROGRESA is associated with an increase in educational aspirations of a third of
a school year. Including the control variables alters neither the magnitude nor the precision
of the coe¢ cient of interest in any of the regressions.
Finally, in columns (2), (5), and (8) we include the parents￿highest educational level
in years. The magnitude of the coe¢ cients indicates that, ceteris paribus, PROGRESA￿ s
e⁄ect on aspirations for all children is comparable to that associated with parents having
two extra years of schooling (considering column (2): 0:313
0:165 = 1:9). When considering only
daughters the e⁄ect is stronger (considering column (5): 0:382
0:167 = 2:3). This is quite relevant,
given that the average education of adults in our sample is about three years (as shown in
14The variables that are statistically di⁄erent are the age of the head of the household and the proportion
of male children in the household.
12Table 1). There seems to be no signi￿cant e⁄ect for sons.
In order to better understand the reason why changes in parental aspirations are greater
for daughters than for sons, it would be useful to have data on the gender of the personnel
in the health clinics in the 1998-1999 period. Unfortunately, this type of data is available
for 2007 only. In this year, while 46% of the doctors were female doctors, 93% of the nurses
were female nurses. Thus, to the extent that the proportion of female doctors and nurses
in 1998-1999 was similar to the one in 2007, a plausible explanation of our results would be
that parents are changing their aspirations for daughters due to their exposure to female
health personnel.
Overall, the evidence suggest that PROGRESA￿ s bene￿ciaries have increased their as-
pirations for their children￿ s education, and this e⁄ect seems to be driven by increases in
the aspirations for daughters, not for sons. Although this is an interesting result, it does
not enable us to pinpoint the driving force behind the change. In the following subsection,
we explore the role of exposure to doctors and nurses as a possible channel for increasing
the educational aspirations of the poor.
4.2 The e⁄ect of di⁄erential exposure to educated professionals on aspi-
rations
Exploiting the design of PROGRESA, we divide the sample into two groups with di⁄erent
levels of mandated exposure to nurses and doctors. We consider high-exposure households
to be those with children less than ￿ve years of age and that must go to the health clinics
at least four times per year. Furthermore, we consider low-exposure households to be those
with no children less than ￿ve years of age and that are required to attend health clinics
only once or twice per year.15
To identify the e⁄ect of di⁄erential exposure to educated professionals on parents￿aspi-
rations for their children￿ s education, we need to control for any systematic variation to the
aspirations of households with high exposure in the treatment villages that are correlated
15We consider only these two categories because we did not ￿nd any di⁄erential e⁄ect of exposure between
households with children less than two years of age and households with children 2-5. Results are available
upon request. Furthermore, since the aspirations questions in rounds three and four were asked only for
children 6-16 years old, we cannot compare households with children less than seventeen years of age and
households with no children less than seventeen years of age.
13with, but not due to, the introduction of PROGRESA. We do this using a ￿di⁄erences-
in-di⁄erences-in-di⁄erences￿(or triple di⁄erence) estimator as in Gruber (1994). First, we
include a ￿xed time e⁄ect to capture any trend in the aspirations of the households. Sec-
ond, we control for di⁄erences in aspirations in treatment villages with respect to control
villages including a treatment village dummy. Third, we control for changes over time
in treatment villages interacting a time dummy with a treatment village dummy. Thus,
we estimate the change in average aspirations before and after the introduction of PRO-
GRESA of households with di⁄erent mandated exposure to highly educated professionals
in treatment villages relative to control villages. The triple di⁄erence estimator captures
all variation in aspirations speci￿c to high-exposure households (relative to low-exposure
households) in the treatment villages (relative to the control villages) six months and one
year after the start of PROGRESA (relative to before the introduction of PROGRESA).
As Gruber (1994) points out, the identifying assumption of this triple di⁄erence estimator
is only that there are no contemporaneous shocks that a⁄ect the aspirations of the high-
exposure households relative to the low-exposure households in the same village-time at
the start of PROGRESA.
By focusing on these two subgroups of households, we are aware that we are compro-
mising the virtues of PROGRESA￿ s experimental design. In Table 4, we show descriptive
statistics of households in both treatment and control groups by level of mandated exposure
at baseline. High-exposure households (i.e., with children less than ￿ve) are, on average,
￿younger￿than low-exposure households (i.e., without children less than ￿ve). Also, high-
exposure households have fewer adults and more children than low-exposure households.
The last two columns of Table 4 show that high- and low-exposure households are similar
across treatment and control villages.
Treatment households with high exposure receive, on average, lower cash transfers than
do treatment households with low exposure, and this di⁄erence is statistically signi￿cant.16
The di⁄erence in the amount of cash received is explained by the fact that households with
children less than ￿ve have younger children. This implies that these households have fewer
16The cash transfers (educational and health components) presented in Table 4 are calculated considering
the household￿ s demographic structure and assuming that each household complies with all of PROGRESA￿ s
requirements. Considering this measure, high-exposure households receive, on average, 32 pesos less per
month than do low-exposure households.
14children of school age who would be eligible to receive the educational cash transfers, which
constitute the largest component of PROGRESA￿ s transfers. Despite these di⁄erences, the
monthly income (not including trasfers) of high- and low-exposure households is not very
di⁄erent, and the null that the monthly income of high- and low-exposure households is the
same cannot be rejected. Thus, the marginal utility of the cash transfers may be higher for
low-exposure households.
Column (iii) of Table 5 reports in rows 4 and 10 the double di⁄erence estimators for
all children after six months following the start of the program for high- and low-exposure
households, respectively. PROGRESA seems to have had an impact on parental aspirations
for high-exposure households but not for low-exposure ones. In fact, panel C, column
(iii), row 13, of Table 5 reports, highlighted in yellow, the triple di⁄erence estimator six
months after the implementation of PROGRESA. Average aspirations of high-exposure
households relative to low-exposure households in treatment villages relative to control
villages are a third of a school year higher six months after the start of the program.
This di⁄erence is statistically signi￿cant and suggests that aspirations are not driven by
a ￿PROGRESA e⁄ect￿but by exposure to highly educated professionals given that low-
exposure households receive, on average, more cash from PROGRESA￿ s transfers than do
high-exposure households. Analyzing daughters and sons separately, we ￿nd a similar story.
One year after the start of the program, however, the double di⁄erence estimators
reported in columns (iii), (vi), (ix), rows 5 and 11, for high- and low-exposure households,
respectively, show that PROGRESA increased the parental aspirations for both types of
households. This is particularly true in the case of daughters. Indeed, as shown by the
triple di⁄erence estimators highlighted in yellow in panel C, row 14 of Table 5, there is not
a statistically signi￿cant di⁄erence in the average aspirations of high-exposure households
relative to low-exposure households in treatment villages relative to control villages a year
after the start of the program for either all children, daughters, or sons.
Focusing on the case of daughters, the data seems to suggest that the aspirations of
parents from low-exposure households have caught up with those of parents from high-
exposure households. As shown in Table 5, column (vi), row 6, the di⁄erence in the average
change in aspirations of high-exposure households six months and one year after the start
15of PROGRESA is not statistically di⁄erent from zero. On the other hand, as can be seen
in Table 5, column (vi), row 12, the di⁄erence in the average change in aspirations of low-
exposure households six months and one year after the start of PROGRESA is negative
and statistically di⁄erent from zero. This suggests that it is the amount of exposure (i.e.,
the number of meetings) that a⁄ects aspirations and not the frequency of these meetings.
Overall, results seem to suggest that mandated exposure to nurses and doctors has a
positive e⁄ect on parental aspirations. Furthermore, it seems that it is the amount and not
the frequency of exposure that drives the change in parental aspirations. If it were the case
that, because they were bene￿ciaries, parents felt compelled to respond in a certain way,
both types of bene￿ciaries would change their answers after the start of the program. Also,
if the force behind the change in aspirations was an income e⁄ect due to the transfers, then
the households that received higher transfer amounts (those with older children) should be
the ones reporting higher aspirations. Finally, if the parents were changing there aspirations
based on a correctly estimated present-discounted value of schooling, then the education-
conditional cash transfer may have been greater for low-exposure households. Indeed, as
the bene￿ts of the program were granted by the government for a three year period only,
low-exposure households have a greater incentive to overstate their educational aspirations,
given that they would be gaining the most in terms of the education-conditional cash
transfers. In fact, had the three years promise applied, by the time the children of high-
exposure households had reached the grade to start receiving the transfer, the program
would have already been discontinued. Only in the case in which there had been 100%
certainty that the program would have been continued for a longer time period, high-
exposure households would have had an incentive to overstate their aspirations. This last
case seems highly unlikely as, at that time in Mexico, social programs used to disappear as
soon as there was a change in administration.
In order to control for the di⁄erences in observable household characteristics between
16high- and low-exposure households we run the following regression:17
ASPivt = ￿ + ￿1Xivt + ￿2￿t + ￿3Tv + ￿4EXi +
￿5(￿t ￿ Tv) + ￿6(￿t ￿ EXi) + ￿7(Tv ￿ EXi) +
￿8(￿t ￿ Tv ￿ EXi) + ￿ivt (2)
where, ASPivt denotes the educational aspirations of the parents of household i in village v
at time t; Xivt is a vector of observable household characteristics that controls for di⁄erences
between households with high and low exposure;18 ￿t is a time dummy; and Tv is a village
dummy that equals one for households in treatment villages; EXi, is a dummy that equals
one for households with high exposure to health professionals; and ￿ivt is an idiosyncratic
error term.
The similarities between this regression and the results presented in Table 5 are straight-
forward. The ￿xed e⁄ects control for the time-series changes in aspirations (￿2), the time-
invariant characteristics of the treatment villages (￿3), and the time-invariant characteristics
of the high-exposure households (￿4). The second-level interactions control for changes over
time in the treatment villages (￿5), changes over time for the high-exposure households (￿6),
and time-invariant characteristics of the high-exposure households in the treatment villages
(￿7).
The third-level interaction, ￿8, is the coe¢ cient of interest. It captures all variation in
aspirations speci￿c to the high-exposure households (relative to the low-exposure house-
holds) in the treatment villages (relative to the control villages) six months or one year
after the introduction of PROGRESA (relative to before the introduction of PROGRESA).
17If there were to be unobservable characteristics that would cause high-exposure parents to have their
aspirations a⁄ected di⁄erently by PROGRESA than low-exposure, we would not be able to detect such
change and we would instead attribute it to high- or low- exposure to professionals. Nevertheless, it is
unclear what these unobservable characteristics would be and whether they would cause a higher increase or
decrease in aspirations for high-exposure parents versus low-exposure. For example, consider responsiveness
to the program (i.e., to its economic incentives) as a possible unobservable variable. Younger and better
educated households may be more responsive because they are used to be taught. On the other hand, these
same households may be less responsive because they think they already know how to take care of their
lives.
18The control variables included are the head￿ s age, his educational level, whether he is literate, whether
he is indigenous, the spouse￿ s age, her educational level, whether she is literate, whether she is indigenous,
the number of male and female adults, the number of male and female children, the birth spacing between
the ￿rst and second child, and the household￿ s monthly income.
17Table 6 shows the estimates of regression (2) six months (Panel A) and one year (Panel
B) after the start of PROGRESA. The ￿rst row of Table 6, Panel A, presents the estimates
of the third-level interaction, ￿8 (i.e., the e⁄ect of exposure six months after the start of
PROGRESA), whereas the second row presents the estimates of the PROGRESA e⁄ect
for low-exposure households, ￿5. The coe¢ cients in columns (1), (5) and (9) correspond
exactly to the coe¢ cients in Table 5, row 13 (for the exposure e⁄ect) and row 10 (for the
PROGRESA e⁄ect on low-exposure households), columns (iii), (iv), and (ix). Introducing
additional household characteristics does not have a sizeable impact on either the exposure
e⁄ect coe¢ cient or the coe¢ cient denoting the PROGRESA e⁄ect on low-exposure house-
holds. Independently of the speci￿cation, di⁄erential exposure seems to increase aspirations
for all children by a third of a school year six months after the start of the program.
In column 2, we control for the parents￿highest educational level in years. The mag-
nitude of the coe¢ cients indicates that, ceteris paribus, being exposed to educated profes-
sionals leads to the same increase in aspirations for children as would be associated with
parents who had two extra years of schooling (0:380
0:179 = 2:1). Thus, exposure to educated
professionals seems to have almost the same e⁄ect on aspirations as average parental educa-
tion (three years). Overall, di⁄erential exposure seems to be what matters since there is no
statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect of PROGRESA per se. Considering daugthers only, di⁄eren-
tial exposure seems to increase aspirations by half of a school year six months after the start
of the program. For the case of sons, di⁄erential exposure seems to increase aspirations by
a quarter of a school year; however, this e⁄ect is not statistically signi￿cant.
Table 6, Panel B, shows similar estimates one year after the start of PROGRESA. The
coe¢ cients in columns (1), (5), and (9) correspond exactly to the coe¢ cients in Table 5,
row 14 (for the exposure e⁄ect) and row 11 (for the PROGRESA e⁄ect on low-exposure
households), columns (iii), (iv), and (ix). Introducing additional household characteristics
does not have a sizeable impact on the exposure e⁄ect. For all children, daughters and
sons, the coe¢ cient measuring the exposure e⁄ect is close to zero and not statistically
signi￿cant. We do observe an e⁄ect of PROGRESA on low-exposure households for some
speci￿cation for the case of daughters. This e⁄ect might be explained by the possibility
that parental aspirations in low-exposure households have caught up with those of the
18high-exposure households. However, in all the other cases the PROGRESA e⁄ect on low-
exposure households is never signi￿cant.
Overall, our ￿ndings seem to be robust to the inclusion of controls in the regression
speci￿cation. Thus, mandated exposure to nurses and doctors appears to have a positive
e⁄ect on parental aspirations, and the data seems to suggest that might the amount and
not the frequency of exposure that drives the change in parental aspirations.
4.3 Alternative aspiration outcomes
An increase of 0.3 or 0.5 years of schooling may be di¢ cult to interpret. Thus, instead of
converting the data on aspirations into years of schooling, we created the variable ￿at least
college,￿a dummy that equals one if the respondent aspires to at least 16 years of schooling
for her children.19 Working with this variable allows us to see what proportion of households
changed their responses as a result of di⁄erential mandated exposure to nurses and doctors.
These results, in turn, may be easier to interpret than the changes in aspirations in years
of schooling, and may help us understand what is driving the increases of 0.3 or 0.5 years
of schooling.
As shown in Figure 1, at baseline, the proportion of households aspiring for their children
to ￿nish at least college is higher for the control group than for treatment group. However,
at six months and one year after the start of the program, this proportion is greater for
households in the treatment group.
We ￿rst consider the e⁄ect of PROGRESA on raising the proportion of parents who
would like their children to complete at least college. Table 7, row 1, shows that, at
baseline, more than 25% of the households want their children to at least complete college.
The program seems to increase by 15% (0:040
0:264100) and 19% (0:050
0:264100) the proportion of
parents who aspire for their children to ￿nish college six months and a year after the start
of the program, respectively. The e⁄ects are larger for daughters: the program seems to
19We do not consider the variable ￿at least primary education￿and ￿at least secondary education￿because
more than 99% and 90% of the respondents declared that they wanted their children to at least ￿nish
their primary and secondary education, respectively. Given that the proportions were already high, the
introduction of PROGRESA did not have any sizeable e⁄ect on modifying them. Also, we do not consider
the results for the variable ￿at least technical school￿ because the proportion of households that aspired
for their children complete at least a technical degree was low (less than 13%) and was not a⁄ected by
PROGRESA. Finally, results for ￿at least high school￿are similar to the ones reported below on ￿at least
college￿and are available upon request.
19increase by 20% (0:046
0:228100) and 25% (0:057
0:228100) the proportion of parents who aspire for their
daughters to ￿nish college six months and a year after the start of the program, respectively.
Although these increments are statistically signi￿cant for daughters, there is no signi￿cant
impact for sons.
We now consider the e⁄ect of exposure on raising the proportion of parents who would
like their children to complete at least college. Table 8 shows the results. About 25% of high-
exposure households and 30% of low-exposure households declared that they wanted their
children to ￿nish at least college. Six months after the start of the program, we see, again, a
di⁄erential impact on parental aspirations. As summarized by the triple di⁄erence estimator
in row 13, 7% more of high-exposure households that received PROGRESA declared that
they wanted their children to at least ￿nish college. This 7% increase corresponds to a
29% (0:069
0:242100) increase in the proportion of parents who aspire for their children to ￿nish
college. When looking separately at daughters and sons, results are similar, and the triple
di⁄erence estimator shows a statistically signi￿cant increase of 8% for daughters and 6%
for sons. This e⁄ect corresponds to a 40% (24%) increase in the proportion of parents
who aspire for their daughters (sons) to ￿nish high school. One year after the start of
the program, we see, again, the catch up e⁄ect, and, hence, the triple di⁄erence estimator
decreases in magnitude and becomes not statistically signi￿cant.
Thus, it seems to be the case that the increase in parental aspirations of 0.3 schooling
years, due to exposure to educated professionals, is the result of a 29% increase in the
proportion of households that aspire to see their children ￿nishing college. When looking
only at daughters, increases are much higher. The results of the ￿at least￿variables are
robust to the inclusion of controls in the regression.20
5 Robustness checks
5.1 Age e⁄ect
Table 9 reports regressions similar to those in Table 6. The di⁄erence is that, in Table 9,
we added a triple interaction that is intended to capture a possible age e⁄ect. This allows
20Results are available upon request.
20us to check whether parental aspirations about their children￿ s education depend on their
children￿ s age. Hence, in order to control for a possible age component, we interact ￿t, a
time dummy, with Tv, the dummy variable that equals one for households in treatment
localities, with the age of the youngest child.
We use the age of the youngest child for two reasons. First, we need a measure at the
household level because our aspirations measure is built at the household level. Second,
we need to be consistent about the way in which we construct the exposure dummy, which
divides households into low- and high-exposure based on the age of the youngest child.
Table 9 shows that the results do not change once we control for a possible age component
and that such a component is very close to zero and is not statistically signi￿cant. Thus,
there does not seem to be an age e⁄ect.21
5.2 Children￿ s health and parental aspirations
In section 4.2 we explored the e⁄ect of di⁄erential exposure to educated professionals on as-
pirations by comparing households with high and low exposure to professionals. A possible
concern could be that visits to the health clinics not only expose parents to professionals,
but also enable children to get health treatments in the mean time. These treatments may
improve children￿ s health status and so have an impact on the educational aspirations of the
parents, other than through exposure to professionals. We may think of a simple human
capital argument: the healthier the children, the more likely parents wish to invest in them
since their life horizon increases.
The ideal experiment to isolate the causal impact of exposure to professionals on educa-
tional aspirations would entail visits to professionals that are utterly useless in themselves.
In this experiment, we would be sure that the e⁄ect would simply come from interacting
with trained professionals, not from a treatment these professionals may give. As such an
experiment is not available, we study if there is any relationship between chidren￿ s health
and educational aspirations of the parents. Since data on children being ill is available in
round three, we consider households living in control villages as they are not in￿ uenced by
21We also run a regression with time and households ￿xed e⁄ects considering only the control group (which
is not a⁄ected by PROGRESA) with aspirations as a dependent variable and age of the youngest child as
explanatory variable. The coe¢ cient associated with the age of the youngest is not statistically signi￿cant.
The results are available upon request.
21their exposure to professionals, or by PROGRESA￿ s conditionality requirements.
We consider two di⁄erent children health measures: a dummy equal to one if the house-
hold had a child ill at most 3 days during the previous month, and a dummy equal to one
if the household had a child ill at least 20 days during the previous month. The former
intends to measure a minor illness, such as a simple cold, while the latter intends to measure
a more serious illness that could have strong repercussions.22
Table 10 shows the results of running OLS regressions of parental aspirations on the
children￿ s health measures. Parental aspirations do not seem to be linked to their children￿ s
health status, independently of whether we consider a minor or a serious illness. These
regressions do not have a causal interpretation and only intend to show that there does
not seem to be any signi￿cant relationship between parents￿educational aspirations and
children￿ s health. Thus, it does not seem that plausible that health improvements caused
by visits to the health clinic have an impact on the educational aspirations of the parents.
5.3 Falsi￿cation test
In order to check whether our results are spurious, we perform the same analysis that
we have conducted thus far on the non-eligible households.23 That is, we check whether
the parental aspirations of those households that are not eligible to receive the bene￿ts
of PROGRESA, and, hence, are not required to send their children to school or regularly
present at the health clinics for check-ups, are also changing.
Table 11 summarizes our results. As shown in columns (iii), (vi), and (ix), rows 4
and 5, for high-exposure households, and rows 10 and 11, for low-exposure households,
after the start of PROGRESA, non-eligible parents did not change the aspirations that
they had for their children. Consequently, the triple di⁄erence estimators reported in
columns (iii), (vi), and (ix), rows 13 and 14, are not statistically di⁄erent from zero, which
indicates that neither after six months nor after one year from the start of PROGRESA
did non-eligible parents change their aspirations for their children￿ s education. All of these
22Regression results using di⁄erent health measures (e.g. having a child ill at least 5, 10, and 15 days)
show very similar results and are available upon request.
23Within every locality where the program is implemented, households are non-eligible to receive PRO-
GRESA￿ s bene￿ts if they are above the poverty level as determined by discriminant analysis on census
data.
22results are robust to the inclusion of controls in a regression framework. Hence, we can be
con￿dent that our ￿ndings are the result of the introduction of PROGRESA and not of some
other circumstance that occurred in the treatment villages that may have been a⁄ecting
households with children less than ￿ve years of age di⁄erently relative to households with
older children.
5.4 Identity of the respondent
We exploit di⁄erences regarding the identity and the exposure to professionals of the survey
respondent. In fact, mothers are not always the survey respondents. Nevertheless, they are
the ones that take the children to the health clinic. Thus, mothers are the ones exposed
the most to doctors and nurses. Hence, as a robustness check, we exploit the di⁄erences
regarding the identity of the respondent in each household in order to identify the e⁄ect of
di⁄erential exposure to educated professionals.
In particular, we consider only households where the mother is present. Using these
households, we divide the sample into households in which the respondent of the question-
naire is the mother and households in which the respondent of the questionnaire is another
household member. Table 12 shows the results considering data at baseline and at six
months after the start of the program. For this table we consider only households in which
the respondent is the mother both at baseline and six months after the start of the program,
and households in which the respondent is not the mother both at baseline and six months
after the start of the program. Table 13 shows the results considering data at baseline and
at one year after the start of the program. For this table we consider only households in
which the respondent is, and is not, the mother in all three survey rounds￿ baseline, six
months and one year after the start of the program.
Columns (iii), (vi), and (ix) of Table 12 report in row 3 the double di⁄erence estimators
for daughters and sons six months after the start of the program for households in which
the respondent is the mother; row 6 shows the double di⁄erence estimators for households
in which the respondent is not the mother. PROGRESA seems to have a positive and
statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect on parental aspirations for households in which the respondent
is the mother but not for households where the respondent is not the mother. Nevertheless,
23the triple di⁄erence estimators reported in row 7 are not very precise, due to the reduction
in sample size, and hence are not statistically signi￿cant. Results in Table 13 are similar,
but less precisely estimated and smaller in magnitude consistent with all previous results
after one year of the start of the program.
5.5 Alternative subsamples
We consider alternative subsamples in order to analyze households with more comparable
family structures. In particular, we focus on the following four subsamples: (i) households
with exactly two children less than 11 years of age; (ii) households with exactly three
children less than 11 years of age; (iii) households with one child of age ￿ve and other
siblings; (iv) households with one child of age six and other siblings. For all four subsamples,
we obtained similar results to those reported above for the whole sample. Nevertheless,
when reducing the sample size, the variability increases causing the estimates to not always
be statistically signi￿cant.24
6 Educational aspirations and behavioral outcomes
The fourth survey round contains information about the time each household member allo-
cated to 18 di⁄erent activities during the previous day. Because bene￿ciary households are
in￿ uenced not only by their exposure to professionals, but also by PROGRESA￿ s condition-
ality requirements (i.e., attending school and visiting the health clinic), it is not possible
to isolate the impact that aspirations might have on behavioral outcomes such as the time
spent by children studying and working.25 However, we are still able to check whether, for
households living in control villages, there is any relationship between parental aspirations
toward their children￿ s education and the time their children spend doing school homework
and working. We consider households from control villages because their behavior was not
in￿ uenced by PROGRESA￿ s conditionality requirements, since they were not receiving the
bene￿ts of the program.
24Regression results for the subsamples are available upon request.
25For example, an increase in school attendance could be caused by exposure to doctors and nurses as
well as by the educational cash transfers received for attending school.
24Table 14 shows the results of running OLS regressions of the time used by children
doing homework and working, on parental aspirations. In particular, Panel A of Table
14 shows that there is a positive and signi￿cant relationship between parents￿educational
aspirations and the number of minutes children spend doing their homework. In contrast,
Panel B of Table 14 outlines a negative link between parents￿educational aspirations and
the number of minutes their children spend working at home or outside. These regressions
however, do not have a causal interpretation. For example, children that do not work and
spend their afternoons doing homeworks may do well in school, and this good performance
may increase the educational aspirations their parents have for them. Still, the positive
(for homework) and negative (for work) signs of the coe¢ cients suggest that an increase in
parental educational aspirations might result in a decrease in child labor and an increase
in the time children spend studying.
7 Conclusions
Poverty almost certainly a⁄ects the way people think and make decisions (Du￿ o, 2006),
which causes the poor to have limited aspirations, and, as a result, might cause them to
underinvest in the education of their children thereby generating a self-sustaining poverty
trap (Ray, 2006; Appadurai, 2004). Understanding if the aspirations of the poor can be
increased and, if so, through which channel(s) is an important tool for reducing poverty.
This paper studies the e⁄ect of PROGRESA on poor parents￿aspirations for the edu-
cational attainment of their children and explores the role of mandated exposure to edu-
cated professionals as a possible channel for increasing aspirations. First, we compare the
outcomes of households that had been randomly selected to receive the bene￿ts of PRO-
GRESA against the outcomes of statistically similar households that had not been selected
to participate in the program. We show that bene￿ciary parents have higher educational
aspirations for their children of about a third of a school year than do non-bene￿ciary
parents. When looking separately at daughters and sons, we ￿nd that the e⁄ect is mainly
driven by daughters.
Then, we take advantage of the design of PROGRESA, which generates di⁄erential ex-
25posure to highly educated professionals. In fact, we consider high-exposure households to be
those with children less than ￿ve years of age and that must present at the health clinics at
least four times per year. We consider low-exposure households to be those without children
less than ￿ve years of age and that are required to attend health clinics only once or twice
per year. We estimate the change in average aspirations before and after the introduction
of PROGRESA for households with high exposure to highly educated professionals (rela-
tive to households with low exposure) in treatment villages (relative to control villages).
Average aspirations for all children of high-exposure households (relative to low-exposure
households) in treatment villages (relative to control villages) are a third of a school year
higher six months after the start of the program (relative to before its introduction). This
di⁄erence is statistically signi￿cant and suggests that the channel through which parental
aspirations are changing is the households￿exposure to highly educated professionals. When
considering daughters and sons separately, we ￿nd, again, that the e⁄ect is mainly driven
by daughters. 2007 data on the gender of health personnel suggest that this result might
be driven by the fact that the majority of the health personnel is female.
Interestingly, a year after the start of the program, the aspirations of parents from low-
exposure households catch up to those of high-exposure households. Thus, aspirations seem
to be a⁄ected by a minimum amount of exposure (i.e., a minimum number of meetings)
and not by the frequency of exposure.
We also consider as an alternative aspiration variable the proportion of parents who
declare that they want their children to ￿nish at least college. On the one hand, this
variable allows us to see the impact of the program on the proportion of households that
aspire for college completion for their children. We ￿nd a 15% and a 19% increase in the
proportion of parents who aspire for their children to ￿nish college six months and a year
after the start of the program, respectively. On the other hand, this variable allows us to
see the impact of di⁄erential mandated exposure to doctors and nurses on the proportion of
households that aspire for college completion for their children. Six months after the start
of the program, the increase in parental aspirations of a third of a school year is driven by
a 29% increase in the proportion of households that aspire to see their children ￿nishing at
least college.
26Our ￿ndings are robust to a number of robustness checks. In particular, our results
do not seem to be due to an income e⁄ect from the cash transfers received by the house-
holds, nor by an age e⁄ect, nor by a health e⁄ect, nor because of some other circumstance
occurring in the treatment villages that may have a⁄ected households with high exposure
to doctors and nurses di⁄erently than households with low exposure. As an additional
robustness check, we also exploit di⁄erences in the identity of the survey respondent in
each household. PROGRESA seems to have a positive and statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect
on parental aspirations for households in which the respondent is the mother but not for
households where the respondent is not the mother.
Identifying a possible channel through which aspirations of the poor can be modi￿ed
adds a new tool to the existing options that try to promote increased investments in human
capital and productive assets as a means by which to escape poverty. Furthermore, policy
makers could take advantage of their target population￿ s exposure to educated professionals,
which is generated by the design of the social program, to increase the aspirations of
their bene￿ciaries by encouraging or requiring them to meet with the highly educated
professionals a su¢ cient number of times. Finally, our ￿ndings suggest that, in highly
segregated environments or in contexts in which there is low social interaction or lack
of leaders, promoting exposure to external educated professionals may have important
consequences with respect to the aspirations of the population.
Although we can provide evidence as to whether di⁄erential exposure a⁄ects aspirations,
the data do not allow us to analyze whether higher aspirations a⁄ect parents￿decisions about
the education or labor of their children. Nevertheless, parents￿educational aspirations
seem to be positively related to the number of minutes children spend doing their school
homeworks and negatively related to the time children spend working. This suggests that
an increase in parents￿educational aspirations might result in an increase in human capital
investment and a decrease in child labor.
Future research will aim at getting a deeper understanding of the precise mechanism(s)
through which aspirations change. The possible mechanisms suggested in the literature
for why exposure to highly educated professionals could in￿ uence aspirations are many.
First, according to Ray (2006), exposure stimulates social interactions, which, in turn,
27increase individuals￿aspiration windows. Second, exposure causes information ￿ ows that
allow individuals to learn about opportunities that they might engage in or the investment
it takes to achieve the associated goals. Third, exposure increases the set of alternatives
that people consider because they have bounded rationality.
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32Figure 1: Proportion of Households that Aspire for their Children to Complete 
at Least College 
 Obs. Treatment Control T-stat
a) Characteristics of the head of the household
Age 8,089 41.66 42.39 -2.09**
Educational level in years 8,078 2.88 2.78 0.85
Literate 8,100 0.72 0.71 0.26
Indigenous 8,096 0.41 0.42 -0.07
b) Characteristics of the spouse of the head of the household
Age 7,361 36.70 36.86 -0.59
Educational level in years 7,348 2.65 2.63 0.16
Literate 7,359 0.63 0.62 0.56
Indigenous 7,353 0.41 0.41 0.00
c) Characteristics of the household
Mean age of adults 8,104 36.16 36.55 -1.46
Mean educational level of adults 8,103 3.24 3.16 0.66
Proportion of literate adults 8,103 0.71 0.70 0.48
Proportion of indigenous adults 8,095 0.40 0.41 -0.06
Income 8,106 922.90 946.03 -0.56
d) Household structure
Size 8,106 6.75 6.75 -0.02
   Number of adults 8,106 2.68 2.68 0.15
      Number of female adults 8,106 1.37 1.38 -0.44
      Number of male adults 8,106 1.31 1.29 0.83
      Proportion of male adults 8,102 0.48 0.48 0.61
   Number of children 8,106 4.06 4.06 -0.10
      Number of female children 8,106 1.96 2.01 -1.13
      Number of male children 8,106 2.09 2.05 1.25
      Proportion of male children 8,069 0.52 0.51 2.20**
Proportion of households with children less than 5 years old 8,106 0.65 0.63 1.18
Proportion of households with children between 2 and 5 years old 8,106 0.34 0.33 0.91
Proportion of households with children less than 2 years old 8,106 0.32 0.31 0.54
Birth spacing between children
   - between 1st and 2nd child 7,326 3.23 3.35 -1.24
   - between 2nd and 3rd child 6,423 2.90 2.88 0.32
   - between 3rd and 4th child 4,884 2.80 2.81 -0.19
   - between 4th and 5th child 3,240 2.64 2.72 -1.29
   - between 5th and 6th child 1,953 2.54 2.63 -1.25
   - between 6th and 7th child 1,014 2.38 2.43 -0.61
   - between 7th and 8th child 467 2.34 2.31 0.30
   - between 8th and 9th child 184 2.12 2.19 -0.37
   - between 9th and 10th child 94 1.95 1.76 0.89
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics by Treatment Status, Fixing Household Structure as of Baseline (1997)
Note: T-statistics of difference in means computed clustering at the village level. Differences significant at the *10%, 
**5%, or ***1% level.
MeanTreatment Control T - C Treatment Control T - C Treatment Control T - C
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix)
1. Parental aspirations before 11.662 11.781 -0.119 11.324 11.484 -0.160 11.552 11.674 -0.123
    the start of PROGRESA (0.101) (0.119) (0.156) (0.098) (0.114) (0.151) (0.100) (0.117) (0.154)
2. Parental aspirations after 6 months of 13.053 12.861 0.192 12.944 12.721 0.223 13.056 12.912 0.145
    the start of PROGRESA (0.078) (0.1) (0.126) (0.083) (0.105) (0.133) (0.080) (0.099) (0.128)
3. Parental aspirations after 1 year of 12.558 12.409 0.149 12.509 12.310 0.199 12.497 12.408 0.089
    the start of PROGRESA (0.078) (0.085) (0.116) (0.082) (0.093) (0.124) (0.079) (0.087) (0.118)
4. Change in mean aspirations 1.391 1.080 0.311 1.620 1.237 0.383 1.505 1.237 0.267
    baseline vs. 6 months (0.097) (0.131) (0.163) (0.101) (0.130) (0.164) (0.099) (0.135) (0.167)
5. Change in mean aspirations 0.896 0.628 0.268 1.185 0.826 0.360 0.946 0.733 0.212
    baseline vs. 1 year (0.095) (0.124) (0.156) (0.100) (0.125) (0.160) (0.095) (0.123) (0.156)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Table 2: Average Aspirations per Household Before and After the Start of PROGRESA
All children Daughters Sons
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parenthesis.
Table 3: Average Aspirations per Household Before and After the Start of PROGRESA
All children Daughters Sons
() () () () () () () () ()
Panel A: Impact after 6 months
PROGRESA effect 0.311* 0.313* 0.310* 0.383** 0.382** 0.386** 0.267 0.275* 0.267
(0.163) (0.163) (0.163) (0.164) (0.164) (0.164) (0.167) (0.167) (0.167)
Parents' highest educational level in years 0.165*** 0.167*** 0.162***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
Controls for unbalanced household characteristics
1 No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Probability value for controls
2 --- --- 0.001 --- --- 0.066 --- --- 0.023
Obs. 15,438 15,433 15,369 13,415 13,411 13,349 13,801 13,797 13,738
R
2 (overall) 0.043 0.063 0.044 0.055 0.070 0.055 0.050 0.070 0.050
Panel B: Impact after 1 year
PROGRESA effect 0.268* 0.269* 0.266* 0.360** 0.361** 0.360** 0.212 0.211 0.212
(0.156) (0.156) (0.156) (0.160) (0.161) (0.160) (0.156) (0.156) (0.156)
Parents' highest educational level in years 0.156*** 0.155*** 0.155***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014)
Controls for unbalanced household characteristics
1 No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Probability value for controls
2 --- --- 0.038 --- --- 0.283 --- --- 0.025
Obs. 15,137 15,131 15,078 13,324 13,319 13,268 13,641 13,637 13,583
R
2 (overall) 0.018 0.037 0.019 0.029 0.050 0.030 0.020 0.040 0.021
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parenthesis. Each individual coefficient is statistically significant at the *10%, **5%, or ***1% level.
1Age of the head of the household and proportion of male children are included. 
2Probability value of joint F test for exclusion of all control variables. gp p yjObs. T-stat Obs. T-stat DD T-stat
a) Characteristics of the head of the household
Age 5,053 46.51 39.07 19.52*** 3,036 46.53 40.01 15.03*** 0.93 1.61
Educational level in years 5,044 2.36 3.16 -10.29*** 3,034 2.36 3.02 -7.09*** -0.13 -1.11
Literate 5,062 0.67 0.74 -5.27*** 3,038 0.67 0.73 -3.69*** -0.01 -0.47
Indigenous 5,060 0.39 0.43 -1.72* 3,036 0.41 0.42 -0.46 -0.02 -0.80
b) Characteristics of the spouse of the household head
Age 4,615 41.70 34.20 21.9*** 2,746 41.06 34.64 16.88*** 1.10 2.14**
Educational level in years 4,606 2.26 2.84 -6.6*** 2,742 2.20 2.85 -6.71*** 0.07 0.54
Literate 4,616 0.60 0.65 -2.59*** 2,743 0.59 0.63 -2.47** 0.00 0.06
Indigenous 4,611 0.38 0.42 -2.21** 2,742 0.41 0.41 0.01 -0.04 -1.48
c) Characteristics of the household
Mean age of adults 5,064 39.50 34.37 19.21*** 3,040 39.53 34.85 14.3*** 0.45 1.06
Mean educational level of adults 5,063 3.02 3.36 -5.3*** 3,040 2.92 3.30 -5.07*** 0.04 0.36
Proportion of literate adults 5,063 0.68 0.72 -3.47*** 3,040 0.67 0.71 -3.14*** 0.00 0.07
Proportion of indigenous adults 5,060 0.38 0.42 -2.21** 3,035 0.40 0.41 -0.21 -0.04 -1.31
Monthly income 5,065 932.44 917.81 0.43 3,041 945.76 946.18 -0.01 15.05 0.29
Monthly transfers received in round 2 4,918 340.78 308.70 6.19*** 2,917 0.00 0.00 . 32.08 6.19***
Monthly transfers received in round 3 4,667 362.40 330.82 5.5*** 2,769 0.00 0.00 . 31.57 5.5***
d) Household structure
Size 5,065 5.79 7.26 -20.04*** 3,041 5.83 7.28 -16.9*** -0.01 -0.12
   Number of adults 5,065 2.76 2.64 3.26*** 3,041 2.74 2.64 2.12** 0.02 0.32
      Number of female adults 5,065 1.40 1.36 1.96* 3,041 1.39 1.38 0.46 0.03 0.92
      Number of male adults 5,065 1.35 1.28 2.85*** 3,041 1.35 1.26 2.79*** -0.02 -0.45
      Proportion of male adults 5,063 0.48 0.48 -0.65 3,039 0.48 0.47 1.33 -0.01 -1.44
   Number of children 5,065 3.03 4.61 -27.73*** 3,041 3.08 4.63 -26.01*** -0.03 -0.36
      Number of female children 5,065 1.41 2.26 -21.33*** 3,041 1.51 2.30 -15.62*** -0.05 -0.81
      Number of male children 5,065 1.61 2.35 -18.55*** 3,041 1.57 2.32 -15.19*** 0.01 0.24
      Proportion of male children 5,040 0.55 0.51 4.09*** 3,029 0.51 0.50 0.77 0.02 1.60
Proportion of HHs with children < 5 yrs old 5,065 0.00 1.00 . 3,041 0.00 1.00 . 0.00 .
Proportion of HHs with children 2-5 yrs old 5,065 0.00 0.52 -54.12*** 3,041 0.00 0.51 -44.87*** 0.00 -0.14
Proportion of HHs with children < 2 yrs old 5,065 0.00 0.48 -50.81*** 3,041 0.00 0.49 -42.47*** 0.00 0.14
Birth spacing between children
   - between 1st and 2nd child 4,585 3.37 3.17 2.04** 2,741 3.63 3.20 3.26*** -0.22 -1.33
   - between 2nd and 3rd child 4,049 2.89 2.91 -0.31 2,374 2.79 2.93 -1.54 0.12 1.08
   - between 3rd and 4th child 3,068 2.63 2.86 -3.62*** 1,816 2.63 2.87 -3.27*** 0.02 0.18
   - between 4th and 5th child 2,014 2.50 2.68 -2.39** 1,226 2.45 2.80 -3.9*** 0.16 1.37
   - between 5th and 6th child 1,227 2.27 2.61 -3.65*** 726 2.37 2.69 -2.96*** -0.01 -0.09
   - between 6th and 7th child 638 2.24 2.40 -1.51 376 2.43 2.43 0.04 -0.17 -0.89
   - between 7th and 8th child 304 1.97 2.39 -2.28** 163 2.30 2.31 -0.05 -0.41 -1.7*
   - between 9th and 10th child 125 2.00 2.13 -0.27 59 2.22 2.18 0.09 -0.17 -0.25
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics by Treatment Status and Household Composition, Fixing Household Structure as of Baseline (1997)














HHsTreatment Control T - C Treatment Control T - C Treatment Control T - C
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix)
Panel A: HIGH-exposure households
  1. Parental aspirations before 11.462 11.663 -0.202 11.143 11.378 -0.235 11.368 11.554 -0.186
      the start of PROGRESA (0.105) (0.13) (0.167) (0.102) (0.125) (0.161) (0.104) (0.129) (0.166)
  2. Parental aspirations after 6 months of 13.021 12.782 0.239 12.923 12.597 0.326 13.010 12.832 0.178
      the start of PROGRESA (0.084) (0.111) (0.139) (0.093) (0.116) (0.149) (0.088) (0.113) (0.143)
  3. Parental aspirations after 1 year of 12.501 12.430 0.071 12.441 12.333 0.108 12.414 12.400 0.014
      the start of PROGRESA (0.082) (0.094) (0.125) (0.086) (0.106) (0.136) (0.083) (0.101) (0.130)
  4. Change in mean aspirations  1.560 1.118 0.441 1.780 1.219 0.561 1.643 1.278 0.365
      baseline vs. 6 months (0.107) (0.147) (0.182) (0.110) (0.147) (0.184) (0.110) (0.149) (0.185)
  5. Change in mean aspirations 1.040 0.767 0.273 1.298 0.955 0.344 1.046 0.845 0.200
      baseline vs. 1 year (0.102) (0.132) (0.167) (0.107) (0.134) (0.172) (0.100) (0.135) (0.167)
  6. Line 4 - Line 5 0.520 0.352 0.168 0.481 0.264 0.217 0.597 0.433 0.164
(0.093) (0.126) (0.156) (0.101) (0.138) (0.170) (0.097) (0.134) (0.165)
Panel B: LOW-exposure households
  7. Parental aspirations before 12.037 11.985 0.052 11.663 11.670 -0.007 11.896 11.886 0.011
      the start of PROGRESA (0.117) (0.133) (0.177) (0.115) (0.127) (0.171) (0.118) (0.129) (0.175)
  8. Parental aspirations after 6 months of 13.115 13.003 0.112 12.988 12.959 0.029 13.144 13.051 0.092
      the start of PROGRESA (0.097) (0.11) (0.147) (0.104) (0.127) (0.164) (0.102) (0.116) (0.155)
  9. Parental aspirations after 1 year of 12.669 12.371 0.298 12.653 12.264 0.389 12.662 12.423 0.240
      the start of PROGRESA (0.098) (0.113) (0.15) (0.105) (0.130) (0.167) (0.104) (0.119) (0.158)
10. Change in mean aspirations 1.078 1.018 0.060 1.325 1.290 0.036 1.247 1.166 0.082
      baseline vs. 6 months (0.124) (0.157) (0.199) (0.133) (0.165) (0.212) (0.128) (0.167) (0.211)
11. Change in mean aspirations 0.632 0.387 0.246 0.990 0.594 0.396 0.766 0.537 0.229
      baseline vs. 1 year (0.127) (0.16) (0.204) (0.133) (0.170) (0.215) (0.134) (0.166) (0.213)
12. Line 10 - Line 11 0.446 0.632 -0.186 0.336 0.696 -0.360 0.481 0.629 -0.147
(0.107) (0.14) (0.176) (0.115) (0.160) (0.196) (0.124) (0.151) (0.195)
Panel C: Triple difference estimates
13. Difference between HIGH- and LOW- 0.482 0.100 0.382 0.454 -0.071 0.525 0.395 0.112 0.283
     exposure HHs,  baseline vs. 6 months (0.125) (0.153) (0.197) (0.135) (0.173) (0.219) (0.132) (0.165) (0.211)
14. Difference between HIGH- and LOW- 0.407 0.380 0.027 0.309 0.361 -0.052 0.280 0.308 -0.029
      exposure HHs,  baseline vs. 1 year (0.123) (0.151) (0.195) (0.128) (0.165) (0.209) (0.128) (0.167) (0.210)
15. Line 13 - Line 14 0.074 -0.280 0.354 0.146 -0.432 0.577 0.116 -0.196 0.312
(0.119) (0.155) (0.195) (0.131) (0.185) (0.226) (0.134) (0.173) (0.218)
Table 5: Average Aspirations per Household Before and After the Start of PROGRESA by Type of Household
Daughters Sons
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parenthesis.
All children(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Panel A: Impact after 6 months
Exposure effect 0.382* 0.380* 0.376* 0.387* 0.525** 0.523** 0.542** 0.555** 0.283 0.270 0.256 0.295
         (Time x Treatment x Exposure) (0.197) (0.198) (0.214) (0.218) (0.219) (0.219) (0.233) (0.240) (0.211) (0.211) (0.229) (0.234)
PROGRESA effect 0.060 0.062 0.069 0.041 0.036 0.035 0.032 0.010 0.082 0.099 0.113 0.064
(0.199) (0.200) (0.212) (0.215) (0.211) (0.212) (0.227) (0.233) (0.211) (0.210) (0.222) (0.227)
Parents' highest educational level in years 0.179*** 0.179*** 0.175***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
Controls for parental characteristics
1 No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Controls for household characteristics
2 No No No Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes
Probability value for controls
3 --- --- 0.000 0.000 --- --- 0.000 0.000 --- --- 0.000 0.000
Obs. 15,438 15,433 13,908 12,992 13,415 13,411 12,110 11,348 13,801 13,797 12,451 11,667
R
2 (overall) 0.047 0.069 0.084 0.087 0.058 0.080 0.094 0.098 0.053 0.074 0.087 0.090
Panel B: Impact after 1 year
Exposure effect 0.027 0.022 0.067 0.059 -0.052 -0.068 0.012 0.051 -0.029 -0.039 0.031 0.015
         (Time x Treatment x Exposure) (0.195) (0.195) (0.202) (0.207) (0.209) (0.210) (0.218) (0.225) (0.210) (0.210) (0.217) (0.227)
PROGRESA effect 0.246 0.250 0.209 0.200 0.396* 0.407* 0.333 0.319 0.229 0.235 0.159 0.135
(0.204) (0.152) (0.210) (0.216) (0.215) (0.217) (0.224) (0.233) (0.213) (0.213) (0.219) (0.225)
Parents' highest educational level in years 0.168*** 0.167*** 0.168***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015)
Controls for parental characteristics
1 No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Controls for household characteristics
2 No No No Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes
Probability value for controls
1 --- --- 0.000 0.000 --- --- 0.000 0.000 --- --- 0.000 0.000
Obs. 15,137 15,131 13,682 12,725 13,324 13,319 12,072 11,276 13,641 13,637 12,337 11,516
R
2 (overall) 0.022 0.043 0.060 0.062 0.033 0.053 0.068 0.071 0.024 0.044 0.058 0.060
2The number of male and female adults, the number of male and female children, the birth spacing between the first and second child and the household's monthly income.
3Probability value of joint F test for exclusion of all control variables.
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parenthesis. Each individual coefficient is statistically significant at the *10%, **5%, or ***1% level.
Table 6: Effect of Social Interactions on Average Aspirations at the Household Level After the Start of PROGRESA
1Head's age, his educational level, whether he is literate, whether he is indigenous, the spouse's age, her educational level, whether she is literate, and whether she is 
Daughters Sons
  indigenous.
All childrenTreatment Control T - C Treatment Control T - C Treatment Control T - C
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix)
1. Parental aspirations before 0.264 0.281 -0.017 0.228 0.248 -0.020 0.257 0.273 -0.016
    the start of PROGRESA (0.012) (0.015) (0.02) (0.011) (0.015) (0.018) (0.012) (0.015) (0.019)
2. Parental aspirations after 6 months of 0.421 0.398 0.023 0.397 0.371 0.026 0.423 0.406 0.017
    the start of PROGRESA (0.011) (0.016) (0.02) (0.013) (0.016) (0.021) (0.012) (0.016) (0.020)
3. Parental aspirations after 1 year of 0.313 0.280 0.033 0.306 0.269 0.037 0.306 0.284 0.022
    the start of PROGRESA (0.012) (0.015) (0.019) (0.013) (0.016) (0.020) (0.012) (0.016) (0.020)
4. Change in mean aspirations 0.157 0.117 0.040 0.169 0.123 0.046 0.166 0.133 0.033
    baseline vs. 6 months (0.014) (0.019) (0.024) (0.015) (0.019) (0.024) (0.014) (0.02) (0.024)
5. Change in mean aspirations 0.049 -0.001 0.050 0.078 0.021 0.057 0.049 0.011 0.038
    baseline vs. 1 year (0.015) (0.019) (0.024) (0.016) (0.019) (0.024) (0.015) (0.020) (0.025)
Table 7: Average Aspirations per Household Before and After the Start of PROGRESA
(at least COLLEGE)
Daughters Sons
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parenthesis. 
All childrenTreatment Control T - C Treatment Control T - C Treatment Control T - C
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix)
Panel A: HIGH-exposure households
  1. Parental aspirations before 0.242 0.273 -0.031 0.209 0.242 -0.033 0.237 0.266 -0.030
      the start of PROGRESA (0.012) (0.017) (0.021) (0.012) (0.016) (0.020) (0.012) (0.017) (0.021)
  2. Parental aspirations after 6 months of 0.418 0.385 0.033 0.394 0.352 0.042 0.415 0.392 0.023
      the start of PROGRESA (0.013) (0.018) (0.022) (0.014) (0.018) (0.023) (0.013) (0.019) (0.023)
  3. Parental aspirations after 1 year of 0.306 0.283 0.024 0.301 0.272 0.029 0.295 0.283 0.013
      the start of PROGRESA (0.013) (0.017) (0.021) (0.014) (0.018) (0.023) (0.012) (0.018) (0.022)
  4. Change in mean aspirations  0.176 0.112 0.064 0.184 0.110 0.075 0.179 0.126 0.053
      baseline vs. 6 months (0.016) (0.022) (0.027) (0.017) (0.021) (0.027) (0.016) (0.022) (0.027)
  5. Change in mean aspirations 0.065 0.010 0.055 0.091 0.030 0.061 0.058 0.016 0.042
      baseline vs. 1 year (0.016) (0.021) (0.027) (0.017) (0.021) (0.027) (0.016) (0.023) (0.028)
  6. Line 4 - Line 5 0.111 0.102 0.009 0.093 0.080 0.014 0.120 0.110 0.011
(0.015) (0.023) (0.028) (0.017) (0.024) (0.029) (0.016) (0.026) (0.030)
Panel B: LOW-exposure households
  7. Parental aspirations before 0.306 0.295 0.011 0.263 0.259 0.004 0.295 0.285 0.010
      the start of PROGRESA (0.016) (0.018) (0.024) (0.015) (0.018) (0.023) (0.016) (0.018) (0.024)
  8. Parental aspirations after 6 months of 0.427 0.421 0.007 0.402 0.408 -0.006 0.437 0.430 0.007
      the start of PROGRESA (0.015) (0.018) (0.024) (0.016) (0.021) (0.027) (0.016) (0.018) (0.024)
  9. Parental aspirations after 1 year of 0.325 0.275 0.050 0.318 0.264 0.055 0.328 0.287 0.040
      the start of PROGRESA (0.016) (0.018) (0.024) (0.018) (0.02) (0.027) (0.018) (0.020) (0.026)
10. Change in mean aspirations 0.122 0.126 -0.005 0.139 0.149 -0.009 0.142 0.145 -0.003
      baseline vs. 6 months (0.019) (0.025) (0.031) (0.02) (0.027) (0.033) (0.020) (0.026) (0.033)
11. Change in mean aspirations 0.019 -0.020 0.039 0.056 0.005 0.051 0.033 0.002 0.031
      baseline vs. 1 year (0.02) (0.023) (0.031) (0.021) (0.026) (0.033) (0.022) (0.025) (0.033)
12. Line 10 - Line 11 0.102 0.146 -0.044 0.084 0.144 -0.060 0.109 0.143 -0.034
(0.019) (0.023) (0.03) (0.022) (0.025) (0.033) (0.022) (0.025) (0.033)
Panel C: Triple difference estimates
13. Difference between HIGH- and LOW- 0.054 -0.014 0.069 0.045 -0.039 0.084 0.037 -0.019 0.056
     exposure HHs,  baseline vs. 6 months (0.02) (0.026) (0.033) (0.021) (0.029) (0.035) (0.021) (0.028) (0.035)
14. Difference between HIGH- and LOW- 0.045 0.030 0.016 0.036 0.025 0.010 0.025 0.014 0.011
      exposure HHs,  baseline vs. 1 year (0.02) (0.024) (0.031) (0.021) (0.028) (0.035) (0.021) (0.026) (0.033)
15. Line 13 - Line 14 0.009 -0.044 0.053 0.009 -0.064 0.074 0.011 -0.033 0.045
(0.02) (0.025) (0.032) (0.024) (0.03) (0.038) (0.022) (0.030) (0.037)
Table 8: Average Aspirations per Household Before and After the Start of PROGRESA by Type of Household 
(at least COLLEGE)
Daughters Sons
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parenthesis.
All children(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Panel A: Impact after 6 months
Exposure effect 0.382* 0.361* 0.400* 0.399* 0.525** 0.504** 0.562** 0.582** 0.283 0.261 0.272 0.252
  (Time x Treatment x Exposure) (0.197) (0.215) (0.232) (0.236) (0.219) (0.233) (0.247) (0.256) (0.211) (0.232) (0.250) (0.256)
Age effect -0.004 0.005 0.002 -0.005 0.005 0.005 -0.005 0.004 -0.008
  (Time x Treatment x Age youngest child) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) (0.019) (0.020) (0.021)
PROGRESA effect 0.060 0.088 0.035 0.024 0.036 0.067 0.002 -0.028 0.082 0.113 0.091 0.123
(0.199) (0.230) (0.245) (0.252) (0.211) (0.243) (0.260) (0.272) (0.211) (0.254) (0.267) (0.274)
Controls for parental characteristics
1 No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Controls for household characteristics
2 No No No Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes
Probability value for controls
3 --- --- 0.000 0.000 --- --- 0.000 0.000 --- --- 0.000 0.000
Obs. 15,438 15,404 13,887 12,992 13,415 13,382 12,090 11,348 13,801 13,768 12,430 11,667
R
2 (overall) 0.047 0.047 0.084 0.087 0.058 0.058 0.094 0.098 0.053 0.053 0.087 0.090
Panel B: Impact after 1 year
Exposure effect 0.027 0.015 0.034 0.025 -0.052 -0.067 -0.012 0.012 -0.029 -0.041 -0.006 -0.036
  (Time x Treatment x Exposure) (0.195) (0.204) (0.210) (0.217) (0.209) (0.217) (0.224) (0.235) (0.210) (0.221) (0.228) (0.239)
Age effect -0.004 -0.006 -0.008 -0.005 -0.004 -0.009 -0.004 -0.007 -0.012
  (Time x Treatment x Age youngest child) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.019) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017)
PROGRESA effect 0.246 0.265 0.253 0.248 0.396* 0.421* 0.365 0.376 0.229 0.249 0.209 0.210
(0.204) (0.226) (0.232) (0.240) (0.215) (0.234) (0.244) (0.260) (0.213) (0.238) (0.243) (0.253)
Controls for parental characteristics
1 No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Controls for household characteristics
2 No No No Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes
Probability value for controls
3 --- --- 0.000 0.000 --- --- 0.000 0.000 --- --- 0.000 0.000
Obs. 15,137 15,103 13,661 12,725 13,324 13,291 12,052 11,276 13,641 13,608 12,316 11,516
R
2 (overall) 0.022 0.022 0.060 0.062 0.033 0.033 0.068 0.071 0.024 0.024 0.058 0.061
3Probability value of joint F test for exclusion of all control variables.
1Head's age, his educational level, whether he is literate, whether he is indigenous, the spouse's age, her educational level, whether she is literate, and whether she is indigenous.
2The number of male and female adults, the number of male and female children, the birth spacing between the first and second child and the household's monthly income.
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parenthesis. Each individual coefficient is statistically significant at the *10%, **5%, or ***1% level.
Table 9: Age effect
Sons Daughters All children(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
At least one child ill 0.189 0.087 0.177 0.034 0.021 -0.075 0.750 0.789 0.609 0.575 0.723 0.552
(0.239) (0.257) (0.284) (0.327) (0.279) (0.293) (0.480) (0.517) (0.595) (0.684) (0.524) (0.579)
Controls for parental characteristics
1 No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Controls for household characteristics
2 No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Probability value for controls
3 --- 0.000 --- 0.000 --- 0.000 --- 0.000 --- 0.000 --- 0.000
Obs. 2,722 2,305 2,011 1,720 2,093 1,807 2,722 2,305 2,011 1,720 2,093 1,807
R
2 (overall) 0.000 0.043 0.000 0.038 0.000 0.045 0.001 0.043 0.001 0.038 0.001 0.045
1Head's age, his educational level, whether he is literate, whether he is indigenous, the spouse's age, her educational level, whether she is literate, and whether she is 
indigenous.
At least one child ill at least 20 days
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parenthesis. Each individual coefficient is statistically significant at the *10%, **5%, or ***1% level.
3Probability value of joint F test for exclusion of all control variables.
Table 10: Effect of Children's Health on Parental Aspirations at the Household Level in Round 2
Daughters Sons Daughters Sons All children All Children
At least one child ill at most 3 days 
during the previous month during the previous month
2The number of male and female adults, the number of male and female children, the birth spacing between the first and second child and the household's monthly income.Treatment Control T - C Treatment Control T - C Treatment Control T - C
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix)
Panel A: HIGH-exposure households
  1. Parental aspirations before 12.658 12.510 0.148 12.194 12.123 0.071 12.513 12.358 0.155
      the start of PROGRESA (0.132) (0.16) (0.208) (0.129) (0.158) (0.204) (0.135) (0.162) (0.210)
  2. Parental aspirations after 6 months of 13.549 13.400 0.149 13.355 13.147 0.208 13.530 13.421 0.109
      the start of PROGRESA (0.111) (0.13) (0.171) (0.133) (0.157) (0.206) (0.132) (0.153) (0.202)
  3. Parental aspirations after 1 year of 13.146 13.097 0.049 13.036 12.952 0.084 13.088 13.046 0.042
      the start of PROGRESA (0.106) (0.133) (0.17) (0.120) (0.151) (0.193) (0.131) (0.160) (0.206)
  4. Change in mean aspirations  0.891 0.890 0.001 1.161 1.024 0.137 1.017 1.063 -0.046
      baseline vs. 6 months (0.158) (0.199) (0.254) (0.172) (0.210) (0.271) (0.175) (0.235) (0.293)
  5. Change in mean aspirations 0.488 0.587 -0.099 0.842 0.829 0.012 0.575 0.688 -0.113
      baseline vs. 1 year (0.147) (0.193) (0.242) (0.157) (0.202) (0.255) (0.169) (0.216) (0.274)
  6. Line 4 - Line 5 0.403 0.303 0.100 0.319 0.195 0.124 0.442 0.375 0.067
(0.143) (0.158) (0.213) (0.168) (0.190) (0.253) (0.178) (0.186) (0.257)
Panel B: LOW-exposure households
  7. Parental aspirations before 12.741 12.682 0.058 12.389 12.373 0.015 12.550 12.497 0.053
the start of PROGRESA (0 109) (0 127) (0 167) (0 108) (0 129) (0 168) (0 113) (0 131) (0 173)
Table 11: Average Aspirations per Non-Eligible Household Before and After the Start of PROGRESA by Type of Household
Daughters Sons All children
      the start of PROGRESA (0.109) (0.127) (0.167) (0.108) (0.129) (0.168) (0.113) (0.131) (0.173)
  8. Parental aspirations after 6 months of 13.712 13.495 0.217 13.672 13.425 0.247 13.633 13.461 0.172
      the start of PROGRESA (0.082) (0.099) (0.128) (0.090) (0.130) (0.158) (0.088) (0.115) (0.145)
  9. Parental aspirations after 1 year of 13.195 13.222 -0.027 13.098 13.286 -0.189 13.165 13.061 0.104
      the start of PROGRESA (0.085) (0.108) (0.138) (0.094) (0.119) (0.152) (0.098) (0.127) (0.160)
10. Change in mean aspirations 0.971 0.813 0.158 1.284 1.052 0.232 1.083 0.964 0.119
      baseline vs. 6 months (0.117) (0.151) (0.19) (0.129) (0.173) (0.215) (0.122) (0.161) (0.202)
11. Change in mean aspirations 0.454 0.540 -0.085 0.709 0.913 -0.204 0.615 0.564 0.051
      baseline vs. 1 year (0.118) (0.153) (0.193) (0.126) (0.168) (0.210) (0.130) (0.167) (0.211)
12. Line 10 - Line 11 0.517 0.273 0.243 0.575 0.139 0.436 0.468 0.400 0.068
(0.105) (0.13) (0.166) (0.124) (0.158) (0.200) (0.119) (0.150) (0.191)
Panel C: Triple difference estimates
13. Difference between HIGH- and LOW- -0.080 0.077 -0.157 -0.123 -0.028 -0.095 -0.066 0.099 -0.165
     exposure HHs,  baseline vs. 6 months (0.163) (0.177) (0.24) (0.192) (0.193) (0.272) (0.172) (0.224) (0.282)
14. Difference between HIGH- and LOW- 0.033 0.047 -0.014 0.133 -0.084 0.216 -0.040 0.124 -0.164
      exposure HHs,  baseline vs. 1 year (0.158) (0.18) (0.239) (0.182) (0.211) (0.279) (0.179) (0.204) (0.271)
15. Line 13 - Line 14 -0.113 0.030 -0.143 -0.256 0.056 -0.311 -0.026 -0.025 -0.001
(0.172) (0.165) (0.238) (0.210) (0.215) (0.300) (0.195) (0.207) (0.284)
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parenthesis.Treatment Control T - C Treatment Control T - C Treatment Control T - C
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix)
Panel A: Respondent is the mother (HIGH-exposure)
1. Parental aspirations before 11.768 11.909 -0.140 11.414 11.621 -0.207 11.645 11.788 -0.143
    the start of PROGRESA (0.121) (0.125) (0.173) (0.118) (0.120) (0.168) (0.121) (0.124) (0.174)
2. Parental aspirations after 6 months of 13.123 12.784 0.339 13.011 12.693 0.318 13.079 12.784 0.295
    the start of PROGRESA (0.087) (0.124) (0.151) (0.095) (0.134) (0.164) (0.090) (0.121) (0.151)
3. Change in mean aspirations  1.355 0.875 0.480 1.597 1.072 0.525 1.434 0.996 0.438
    baseline vs. 6 months (0.121) (0.159) (0.200) (0.128) (0.168) (0.211) (0.130) (0.161) (0.207)
Panel B: Respondent is NOT the mother (LOW-exposure)
4. Parental aspirations before 11.710 11.484 0.226 11.415 11.142 0.274 11.639 11.428 0.210
    the start of PROGRESA (0.175) (0.259) (0.313) (0.176) (0.237) (0.295) (0.175) (0.256) (0.310)
5. Parental aspirations after 6 months of 13.234 13.077 0.158 13.100 12.842 0.258 13.255 13.241 0.014
    the start of PROGRESA (0.173) (0.184) (0.253) (0.203) (0.178) (0.270) (0.193) (0.200) (0.277)
6. Change in mean aspirations  1.524 1.593 -0.068 1.685 1.700 -0.016 1.616 1.813 -0.196
    baseline vs. 6 months (0.217) (0.304) (0.373) (0.234) (0.283) (0.366) (0.227) (0.315) (0.388)
Panel C: Triple difference estimates
7. Difference between HIGH- and LOW- -0.169 -0.717 0.548 -0.087 -0.628 0.541 -0.182 -0.816 0.634
     exposure HHs,  baseline vs. 6 months (0.223) (0.316) (0.386) (0.247) (0.302) (0.390) (0.230) (0.328) (0.401)
Treatment Control T - C Treatment Control T - C Treatment Control T - C
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix)
Panel A: Respondent is the mother (HIGH-exposure)
1. Parental aspirations before 11.791 11.899 -0.108 11.424 11.628 -0.205 11.663 11.779 -0.116
    the start of PROGRESA (0.124) (0.135) (0.183) (0.120) (0.131) (0.178) (0.124) (0.134) (0.182)
2. Parental aspirations after 1 year of 12.684 12.580 0.104 12.683 12.499 0.183 12.587 12.527 0.060
    the start of PROGRESA (0.085) (0.116) (0.144) (0.092) (0.128) (0.158) (0.090) (0.123) (0.152)
3. Change in mean aspirations  0.892 0.681 0.211 1.259 0.871 0.388 0.924 0.748 0.176
    baseline vs. 1 year (0.124) (0.181) (0.219) (0.120) (0.186) (0.229) (0.125) (0.185) (0.223)
Panel B: Respondent is NOT the mother (LOW-exposure)
4. Parental aspirations before 11.605 11.227 0.378 11.418 10.766 0.652 11.483 11.207 0.276
    the start of PROGRESA (0.262) (0.329) (0.420) (0.262) (0.335) (0.426) (0.264) (0.328) (0.422)
5. Parental aspirations after 1 year of 12.598 12.426 0.173 12.543 12.280 0.263 12.753 12.413 0.340
    the start of PROGRESA (0.273) (0.342) (0.438) (0.324) (0.362) (0.486) (0.297) (0.363) (0.469)
6. Change in mean aspirations  0.994 1.199 -0.205 1.125 1.514 -0.389 1.270 1.205 0.065
    baseline vs. 1 year (0.284) (0.492) (0.567) (0.336) (0.449) (0.560) (0.264) (0.517) (0.589)
Panel C: Triple difference estimates
7. Difference between HIGH- and LOW- -0.102 -0.518 0.416 0.134 -0.643 0.777 -0.346 -0.457 0.111
     exposure HHs,  baseline vs. 1 year (0.298) (0.510) (0.590) (0.343) (0.474) (0.584) (0.307) (0.531) (0.612)
All children Daughters Sons
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parenthesis.
Table 12: Average Aspirations per Household Before and 6 Months After the Start of PROGRESA by Type of Household
All children Daughters Sons
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parenthesis.
Table 13: Average Aspirations per Household Before and 1 Year After the Start of PROGRESA by Type of Household(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: Effect of Parental Aspirations on Their Children's Time Spent Doing Homework
Parental aspirations 1.284** 1.372** 1.368** 1.039*** 0.908** 0.884** 1.729*** 1.383*** 1.354***
(0.554) (0.562) (0.566) (0.378) (0.410) (0.412) (0.431) (0.436) (0.430)
Controls for parental characteristics
1 No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Controls for household characteristics
2 No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Probability value for controls
3 --- 0.046 0.003 --- 0.294 0.012 --- 0.029 0.008
Obs. 2,601 2,350 2,350 1,237 1,115 1,115 1,268 1,151 1,151
R
2 (overall) 0.003 0.011 0.204 0.006 0.014 0.030 0.012 0.028 0.043
Panel B: Effect of Parental Aspirations on Their Children's Time Spent Working (at Home and Outside)
Parental aspirations -1.267 -1.037 -1.150 -0.304 -0.164 -0.156 -0.335 -0.197 -0.297
(1.061) (1.072) (1.045) (0.449) (0.460) (0.445) (0.962) (1.000) (0.990)
Controls for parental characteristics
1 No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Controls for household characteristics
2 No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Probability value for controls
3 --- 0.000 0.000 --- 0.298 0.160 --- 0.000 0.000
Obs. 2,601 2,350 2,350 1,778 1,607 1,607 1,850 1,682 1,682
R
2 (overall) 0.001 0.022 0.067 0.003 0.004 0.024 0.000 0.019 0.051
  whether she is indigenous.
2The number of male and female adults, the number of male and female children, and the household's monthly income.
3Probability value of joint F test for exclusion of all control variables.
 Table 14: Effect of Parental Aspirations on Their Children's Time Spent Doing Homework and Working
Daughters Sons
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parenthesis. Each individual coefficient is statistically significant at the *10%, **5%, or ***1% level.
1Head's age, his educational level, whether he is literate, whether he is indigenous, the spouse's age, her educational level, whether she is literate, and
All children